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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
K.L.C. INCORPORATED, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent ) 
and Counter Defendant ) 
) 
v~ ) 
) 
RON McLEAN, ) 
Defendant-Appellant ) 
and Counter Plaintiff ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
KEARN'S LIQUIDATION CENTER, INC. ) Appeal No. 18103 
A corporation, and JOHN PARAS, ) 
Counter Defendants- ) 
Respondents ) 
) 
________________________________ ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This Appeal is taken from an Order entered by the Honorable G. Hal 
Taylor, Third District Court for Salt Lake County, dismissing this case with prejudice for 
lack of prosecution. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This case is an action to recover money allegedly misappropriated from a 
corporation. The counterclaim asks for an accounting of corporation assets. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On October 15, 1981, the Court entered an Order dismissing this case with 
prejudice for lack of prosecution. The Order was based on a Motion filed September 4, 
1981 and arguments bef~re the Court on October 5, 1981. 
-1-
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11..t.Ll~t· ::SOUGHT ON ~-'!?~~. A.1: 
Defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the Order dismissing the case so that 
the case may be remanded and a trial held in the matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This matter was initiated with the filing of a Complaint by plaintiff-
respondent K.L.C. Incorporated in 1967, asking for $9,696.00 allegedly appropriated from 
plaintiff by defendant (R. 2-3). Defendant-appellant answered the Complaint and filed a 
counterclaim against plaintiff-respondent K.L.C. Incorporated and against counter 
defendants-respondents Kern's Liquidation Center, Inc. and John Paras alleging a half 
ownership in the plaintiff corporation jointly with counter defendant John Paras, and 
asking for an accounti~ of corporation assets alleged to be worth at least $155,346.91 
(R.6-11). 
Defendant-appellant's original attorney withdrew from the matter in the 
fall of 1968 (R.47), and defendant-appellant obtained new counsel (R.48). 
In July of 1976, the parties entered into a stipulation agreeing to an 
accounting by defendant-appellant of counter defendants-respondents' books and to 
either dismissal of the action following the accounting or to further consideration of 
the matter by the court using the results of the accounting as a basis for judgment 
(R.53). 
In March of 1980, defendant-appellant again obtained new counsel, a notice 
of substitution of counsel being dated March 13, 1980 (R.54). 
On March 27, 1980, a Notice of Taking Deposition was served on plaintiff-
respondent and counter defendants-respondents (R.55). The deposition of counter 
defendant-respondent John Paras was actually taken on July 18, 1980. 
On September 10, 1980, interrogatories were served by defendant on 
counter defendant-respondent John Paras (R. 58-60). 
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On December 18, 1980, defendant-appellant filed its Request for Trial 
Setting (R.61 ). 
On May 5, 1981, counter defendant-respondent John Paras served answers 
to defendant's ir1terrogatories (R. 62-65). 
On May 18, 1981, trial in this matter was set for October 22, 1981 by the 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County (R.66). 
On August 28, 1981, defendant-appellant requested a jury trial and 
tendered the $50.00 jury fee (R.67). 
On September 4, 1981, plaintiff-respondent K.L.C. Incorporated and coun-
ter defendant-respondent John Paras filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution 
(R.68). 
On October 15, 1981, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor dismissed the action for 
lack of prosecution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
. The trial court erred and abused its discretion 
in dism~ing this Action for Jack of prosecution 
inasmuch as the ease had been diligently prmecuted 
for a full year and one-half prior to the time that the 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution was f'tled, 
trial had been set, and defendant-appellant had 
expended time, effort, and money in prosecuting the 
case and in preparing for triaL 
Although there are many Utah Supreme Court decisions dealing with 
dismissal of a case for lack of prosecution, none of these cases appear to treat factual 
issue similar to those raised here. 
In the present case, although there appear to be substantial periods during 
which no action was taken by either side, there was diligent prosecution of the case 
-3-
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rt to 
dismiss for lack of prosecution. Thus, defendant-appellant retained new counsel after 
a period of time during which the case apparently lay dorment. New counsel imme-
diately noticed the deposition of counter defendant John Paras. The deposition was 
taken, interrogatories were served and answered, and the case was set for trial It was 
not until September 4, 1981, just a month and a half prior to the date scheduled for 
trial that plaintiff filed its motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. The motion was 
not made until over three months had passed from the time trial was scheduled and 
followed defendant's request for a jury trial and payment of the required fee. 
Defendant-appellant had gone to significant expense and effort to move 
the matter along by taking a deposition, serving interrogatories, and preparing for 
trial. Plaintiff-respondent and counter def endants-re~ondents had also expended time 
and effort in connection with the deposition and in answering interrogatories, and 
proceeded toward trial for a year and one-half before filing their motion for dismissaL 
Although it may have been proper to dismiss this case for lack of 
prosecution on a motion made in March or April of 1980 immediately after action by 
defendant-appellant to move it forward, it is submitted that such dismissal is 
improper and a clear abuse of discretion after defendant-appellant's substantial efforts 
to move the case ahead and after the case had been set for trial 
While this Court has not previously addressed this issue, courts in several 
other states have. Thus, in a case before the Colorado Court of Appeals, Farber v. 
Green Shoe Mfg. Company, 596 P.2d 398 (1979), in which no action had been taken for 
over five years until a notice to set trial was filed and trial was set, and in which just 
prior to trial a motion to dismiss was filed and granted, the court said: 
Here the motion to dismiss was made after the 
plaintiff had resumed his efforts to prosecute, had 
set the case for trial, and indeed, was ready for trial 
on the very day the motion was heard. Under the 
circumstances, the policy underlying the dismassal 
rule to prevent unreasonable delays is les.s compel-
-4-
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.uu6 '-Al~U '" .. e policy favoring resolution of disputes 
on the merits. Denham v. Superior Court, 2 CaL 3d 
557, 86 CaL Rpts. 65, 468 P.2d 193(1970). Conse-
quently, we hold that the court erred in dismissing 
the action. 
We adopt the rule stated in State v. McClaine, 
261 Ind. 60, 300 N.E.2d 342 (1973): 
'A motion to dismiss for want 
of prosecution should not be 
granted if the plaintiff res-
umes diligent prosecution of 
his claim, even though, at 
some prior period of time, he 
has been guilty of gross negl-
igence.' 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Alabama in reviewing a lower court's 
dismissal for lack of prosecution said in Smith v. Wilcox County Board of Education, 
365 So.2d 659 (1978): 
Although there appeared to be a long period of · 
inactivity from 1966 to 1973, nevertheless within 
the eleven months before the dismissal the defend-
ants filed interrogatories, the parties reconstructed 
the record, and the plaintiff's attorney had tried to 
have a hearing set on the case. 
and further on said: 
.•• even where there has been a period of inactivity, 
present diligence has barred dismissal 
The Missouri Court of Appeals, in reversing a lower court's dismissal for lack of 
prosecution in Laurie v. Ezard, 595 S. W.2d 336 (1980), said: 
A dismissal for failure to prosecute should not 
be based on remote, even if extended, periods of 
inactivity. Yonder Haar Concrete Company v. Ed-
wards-Parker, Inc. supra, 561 S. W.2d at 139. In 
determining whether to dismiss a dormant case, we 
believe that the time a case has been on file and its 
prior inactivity may be considered. However, to 
dismiss a case for prior inactivity while it was being 
-5-
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pursued could cause many ca,.-.;·; ~ .~ ,~, .. ~, .. ;.;""_ -~ -
which should not be. Human nature being what- it-ls-
a~~orneys and parties ma~ not always act in ~ 
d11lgent manner. Our examination of the cases cited 
by the parties and other cases leads us to believe 
that only in an unusual situation should a case be 
dismissed for prior inactivity, on a party's motion, 
at a time when it appeared to be prosecuted toward 
triaL 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in Dollison v. Fireman's Fund Insurance 
Company, 423 P.2d 426 (1966) held that, once a case had been set for trial, it was too 
late for a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. 
Several states have formal rules which 5l)ecify that a case can be dismissed 
for lack of prosecuion if no action is taken in the case for more than a year. Even in 
these jurisdictions, if prosecution of the case is resumed prior to the time a motion to 
dismiss in made, motion is regarded as too late. Thus, the Supreme Court of Alaska in 
First National Bank of Fairbanks v. Taylor, 488 P.2d 1026 (1971) said: 
In our view, the rule applies only where the 
motion to dismiss is filed before the period of the 
lapse is terminated by some affirmative action, that 
is where the last act in the record occurred more 
than one year prior to the motion to dismiss. Here 
the Bank's motion for pre-trial terminated the lapse, 
and the Motion for Summary Judgment and motion 
to set for trial were filed subsequent to the lapse 
and prior to Taylor's motion to diSmiss. 
and the District Court of Appeal of Florida, in Equity Capital Company v. 602 West 26 
Corp. 223 So.2d 762 (1969), said: 
The moving party must seek dismissal prior to 
resumption of affirmative action toward prosecution 
of the case (citations omitted). 
Since defendants did not move for dismissal 
prior to July 29, 1968, the date plaintiff filed its 
motion for deficiency decree, and the court did not 
dismiss this suit on its own motion prior to that 
date, dismissal for failure to prosecute was im-
proper. 
Defendant-appellant submits that dismissal for failure to prosecute in this 
case was improper and that the order should be reversed. Since defendant-appellant 
-A-
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~~~iiiw. :B)~.©~®(CJtll11tc~«:iJ Kine case for over a year prior to the motion to dismiss, 
defendant-appellant should be allowed his day in court. 
POINT TWO 
The trial eourt erred and abused its discretionin 
dismissing this action for Jack of prosecution, whae 
during the period of time that it is alleged the Jack of 
prosecution occurred, the party moving for dismissal 
could have taken action to move the litigation ahead 
to a final conclusion but did not do so. 
In the present case, either plaintiff-respondent or counter defendants-
respondents could have taken action to move the case to trial or to have the case 
dismissed, but neither did so. 
This Court, in upholding the lower court in its refusal to dismiss a case for 
lack of prosecution in Department of Social Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323 {1980), 
said: 
The important fact is that the defendant him-
self did nothing to move the case forward, but 
appears to have been quite contented to let it lie 
dormant until it was re·activated by the plaintiff. 
In Johnson v. Firebrand, 571 P.2d 1368 (1977), this Court reversed the 
lower court's dismissal for lack of prosecution and said: 
As to the lack of prosecution, it seems that 
neither party had any active interest in the matter 
for nearly four years •••• Since either party could have 
brought the matter to a conclusion it is difficult to 
see why the plaintiff should be denied his claim to 
more than $38,000 simply because counsel for plain-
tiff did not take a default judgment. 
In Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P .2d 1135, (1977), this court said: 
Turning now to the issue as to whether or not 
a lapse of 16 months in prosecuting a claim for 
relief is sufficient to support a dismissal with pre-
judice, this court has been active in that area and 
has held that where all of the litigants had power to 
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obtain relief and failed to do so it is error to 
dismiss with prejudice. ' 
and in Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractors, Inc., 544 P.2d 
876 (1975), this court said: 
Whether there is such justifiable excuse is to be 
determined by considering more factors than merely 
the length of time since the suit was filed. Some 
consideration should be given to the conduct of both 
parties, and to the opportunity each has had to move 
the case forward and what they have done about it. •• 
Further in that case, this Court said: 
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with 
dispatch and to move calendars with expedition in 
order to keep them up to date. But it is even more 
important to keep in mind that the very reason for 
the existence of courts is to afford disputants an 
opportunity to be heard and to do justice between 
them. 
Here, plaintiff-respondent, the party who initiated the lawsuit, had the 
same opportunity that defendant-respondent did to move it along. It did not do so. 
Counter defendants-respondents also had such opportunity. They did not do so. 
Defendant-appellant submits that dismissal for lack of prosecution was improper. 
CONLUSION 
Defendant-respondent had actively pursued prosecution of this case from 
March of 1980. It was not until September, 1981, that plaintiff-respondent and 
counter defendant-respondent moved to dismiss for lack of prosecution. This was long 
after trial had been scheduled and only a month and a half prior to triaL Where a 
party has taken action to pursue prosecution of a case, it is submitted that the case 
should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution even though there have been prior 
periods as to which such dismissal might have been proper. Further, where any party 
could have moved the action ahead, but none of them did so, it is believed improper to 
dismiss for lack of prosecution when one party actively moves forward. 
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·Tin'.! oruef u1s1111ssing this case for lack of prosecution should be reversed 
and the case remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert R. Mallinckrodt 
Mallinckrodt & Mallinckrodt 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The foregoing Appellant's Brief was served on plaintiff-respondent and 
counter defendants-respondents by mailing two copies thereof, first class mail, 
postage prepaid, to Earl S. Spafford, Esq., Spafford, Dibb, Duffin & Jensen, 311 South 
State, Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, their attorneys, this 22nd day of January, 
1982. 
.. 
Robert R. Mallinckrodt 
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